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UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS—WHOM
SHALL THEY SERVE?
H. W. PERRY, JR.*
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—
indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (Sutherland, J.) (emphasis added).
The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a
United States attorney of each judicial district. . . .
Each United States attorney is subject to removal by the President.
28 U.S.C. § 541(a), (c) (1994).
No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or
else he will hold to the one and despise the other.
Matthew 6:24.
I
INTRODUCTION
The law and the President may not quite be analogous to God and mam-
mon, not to mention the converse, but the principle expressed in the Gospel of
Matthew is often generalized and raises an important question.  By law, U.S.
Attorneys serve the President at his or her pleasure.1  That concept is easy to
                                                          
Copyright  1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
This essay is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/61LCPPerry.
* Associate Professor of Government and Law; Patterson-Banister Chair Fellow, The University
of Texas at Austin.
The author thanks Neal Devins for his helpful comments, and Joe Smith and Jason Pierce for their
help in preparing this essay.
1. Other relevant requirements are:
28 U.S.C. § 544.  Oath of office
Each United States attorney, assistant United States attorney, and attorney appointed under
section 543 of this title, before taking office, shall take an oath to execute faithfully his duties.
Id. § 547.  Duties
Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district, shall
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understand, at least some 210 years and a few Supreme Court interpretations
later.  But what does it mean to be a servant of the law?  Of course, every
elected official must abide by the law, and every presidential appointee must
attempt to execute it faithfully, but Justice Sutherland in Berger v. United
States2 is suggesting a “peculiar and very definite sense” of fidelity and servi-
tude.  Whatever the Justice meant, his quotation has become ubiquitous on
publications produced by and about U.S. Attorneys.  More importantly, many
suggest that servitude to the law requires political independence in order to be
faithful to the law.  The concept is put dramatically by Francis Biddle, Franklin
Roosevelt’s Solicitor General:  “He is responsible neither to the man who ap-
pointed him nor to his immediate superior in the hierarchy of administration.
The total responsibility is his, and his guide is only the ethic of his own profes-
sion framed in the ambiance of his experience and judgment.”3  Biddle was re-
ferring to the Solicitor General, but often this perspective, to one degree or an-
other, is held about the entire Department of Justice.  In addition to the Bible,
perhaps the epigraph to this article should have included a little Shakespeare:
“To thine ownself be true.”4
Can U.S. Attorneys serve two masters—that is, the President and the law?
Or do U.S. Attorneys have no real masters, and in fact serve only themselves
and their own interests?  The fidelity issue for government lawyers has not
been widely addressed, but to the extent that it has, it usually has been in the
context of the Solicitor General, the Attorney General, independent prosecu-
tors, or independent agencies.5  The issue, however, also applies to U.S. Attor-
neys.  Indeed, the issue may be even more important at the level at which most
                                                          
(1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States;
(2) prosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings in
which the United States is concerned;
(3) appear in behalf of the defendants in all civil actions, suits or proceedings pending in
his district against collectors, or officers of the revenue or customs for any act done by
them or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to officers, and by them paid
into the Treasury;
(4) institute and prosecute proceedings for the collection of fines, penalties, and forfei-
tures incurred for violation of any revenue law, unless satisfied on investigation that jus-
tice does not require the proceedings; and
(5) make such reports as the Attorney General may direct.
Id. § 542.  Assistant United States attorneys
(a) The Attorney General may appoint one or more assistant United States attorneys in any
district when the public interest so requires.
(b) Each assistant United States attorney is subject to removal by the Attorney General.
2. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
3. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act I, sc. 4.
5. See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE
OF LAW (1987); CORNELL CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (1992); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE
POLITICS OF LAW (1992); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994); Louis Fisher, Is the Solicitor General an
Executive or Judicial Agent? Caplan’s TENTH JUSTICE, 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305 (1990); Todd Loch-
ner, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the Independent Agencies: A Ree-
vaulation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 549 n.2 (1993).
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prosecutorial decisions are made.  The purpose of this essay is to begin to ex-
amine these questions and to offer a different way to think about the fidelity
issue.  Concomitantly, it will suggest that there are ways to think about U.S. At-
torneys more generally, theoretically, and systematically, rather than simply re-
sorting to explanations by anecdotes, personalities, and the characteristics of
individual districts.  U.S. Attorneys play a very powerful and important role in
our society, and they deserve more scholarly attention.6
II
SERVING THE PRESIDENT OR THE LAW: POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS VERSUS
FIDELITY TO THE LAW
Watergate inspired calls for the Justice Department to become “non-
political.”7  What is generally meant by that call is that the Department should
not be accountable to the President.  Although arguments for a truly
“independent” Justice Department peaked after Watergate, the concept of the
apolitical government lawyer remains an often expressed ideal.  There is usu-
ally some caveat acknowledging the need for some political responsiveness, but
generally the implication is that it should be very limited.  The experiences of
the last decade with Independent Counsels, however, raise questions about the
desirability of “unaccountable” prosecutors.  Moreover, given the nature of
what attorneys for the United States do, they could never be nonpolitical.  By
definition, the Department’s mission is political—both in the grand sense, but
also in terms of responsiveness.  The whole concept of responsible government
requires that whom we elect matters and that bureaucracy respond accordingly.
Though there is rarely such a thing as a mandate—claims by politicians and the
fixation of some journalists notwithstanding—whom we elect should make a
difference.  By constitutional design we have made departments part of the Ex-
ecutive Branch; as such, they should serve a President’s agenda and are pri-
marily responsive through him or her.8  Of course, there are subtleties.  It is al-
ways the case that when serving the President, one has one’s own ethical
standards and must sometimes decide whether to serve or resign.  And in any
executive department, there is some pull between careerists and presidential
                                                          
6. The author is involved in a larger study of the Department of Justice, one component of which
is to understand better the roles and perceptions of U.S. Attorneys.  This essay reflects some evidence
from interviews with U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, but at this stage the evidence is
only anecdotal and suggestive.  The seminal study on U.S. Attorneys is JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL
FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978).  Much
of what I have learned to date comports with Eisenstein’s findings, though the purpose of my larger
study differs from his focus.
7. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 2 (1974).
8. The extent to which executive agencies have responsibility to the President versus the Con-
gress is, of course, a classic debate in American constitutionalism and in constitutional law.  See, e.g.,
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1997);
LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1990); see also Fisher, supra note 5.
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appointees.9  Nevertheless, democratic theory calls for responsiveness, and the
American version of separation of powers places the Department of Justice
under the President.  Therefore one might conclude that the Department of
Justice is just like any other executive department and basically should act like
one.  The way, then, to understand proper behavior at Justice—normatively
and empirically—is simply to understand separation of powers, the role of the
Executive Branch, and government bureaucracy.  Well, not exactly.
First, it is a difficult normative dilemma to sort out the appropriate interac-
tion of partisanship and impartial administration in any department.  Respon-
siveness sits on one hand; on the other hand sits our whole concept of a civil
service system, which suggests some need for autonomy from political direc-
tion.  In our gut and our rhetoric, if not in our theory, we know that there is
something about the administration of law that makes political responsiveness
even more problematic.  Surely enforcing the law is different from administer-
ing agricultural policies, or even foreign relations.  We expect the Department
of Justice to be different.  Even the most ardent defenders of the need for Jus-
tice to be more faithful to the Executive rather than to the Judicial Branch or to
the lawyer’s own interpretation of the law expect Justice to be less responsive
and partisan than other executive agencies.10  Taking some liberty with Justice
Stewart’s famous quote, we may not know precisely how to define inappropri-
ate hard-core political intrusion into Justice, but we know it when we see it.11
Unlike pornography, however, no one would argue that there is no such thing
as obscene intrusion.  And, unlike pornography, our standards are higher than
simply wishing to ban hard-core intrusion.  Of course, one person’s intrusion is
another’s responsible governing, but compared to other departments, our tol-
erance for political influence is low.
                                                          
9. See HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS IN WASHINGTON
(1977).
10. Charles Fried is probably the most dramatic example of a Solicitor General who thought that
that office had become beholden to pleasing the Justices rather than arguing for the President’s
agenda.  Indeed, the Reagan Justice Department generally was known to be an exponent of this view,
particularly William Bradford Reynolds.  That said, even Fried understood that the law governed him
in ways that forced him to observe it contrary to political forces within the Administration.  See
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT, 173-205 (1991).
It is often argued that the Solicitor General’s independence is not really independence at all, it is
simply strategic.  The argument goes that it is in the interest of the administration to have counsel that
has the profound respect of (and at times deference to) the Court.  Therefore the Solicitor General is
serving the President.  No doubt this is true to some degree and everyone understands this, including
the President.  But there is something else going on.  I have interviewed many attorneys in the Office
of the Solicitor General including six Solicitors General themselves, and I was struck by how much
deference and allegiance they felt toward the Court rather than the President.  Indeed, it was that phe-
nomenon that inspired my larger study of the Justice Department of which this article is a part.
Granted, it is in the administration’s best interest to have counsel that is well respected by the Court,
but persons in that office talk a lot about dual fidelity.
11. With all apologies, of course, to the late Justice Stewart: I may not know how to define hard-
core pornography, “[b]ut I know it when I see it.”  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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One might argue that it is the responsibility of the judiciary, not an execu-
tive department, to be primarily responsible for sorting out the problems of the
interaction of law and politics.  However, judicial checks are insufficient given
the potentially dramatic implications for a person simply to be accused by the
United States and the necessity of enforcing the law without always repairing to
the courts.  One might argue that a dichotomy between political responsibility
and fidelity to the law is a false one, and she or he would be right at some level.
Different individuals, however, might find it false for very different and contra-
dictory reasons.  Some may argue that no one, not even the President, is free to
disobey the law.  Political responsiveness can never be contrary to the law.  Law
is the master, and even the President is its servant, as are his or her underlings.
Well, yes, but prosecutorial discretion is legal.  It can be employed to admit the
most rank form of offensive partisanship, effectively making the law a sham.
Moreover, even with the most upright and non-partisan of prosecutors, laws are
subject to interpretation.  Presidents and Attorneys General often have very
strong feelings about the “proper” interpretation, which may be one that most
observers would find hard to accept as a proper execution of the law, legal or
not.  A completely different way to claim that the dichotomy is false is to argue
that all law is a construct and means nothing in and of itself and therefore can-
not be a real master.  It has no meaning except as it is defined and used by
those with power.  Well, yes, but the person who argues this will be the first to
complain bitterly at the next Watergate about the illegal abuse of power, or the
shameful partisanship that constitutes a dereliction of duty by the Attorney
General or the U.S. Attorney.  In short, despite academic understandings that
“law” as we often use it is a myth, and that the “rule of law” is, at base, a non-
sensical concept—people, not laws rule—no one really wants to live in a society
that does not subscribe to the myth and where those who wield power act as if
“the law” is not meaningfully constraining.  Alas, at some level it may be true
that posing the law and political responsiveness as opposites sets up a straw
man; nonetheless, it is a real dilemma because U.S. Attorneys, and to some de-
gree we all, choose to subscribe to the myth of the rule of law.  Law is some-
thing that controls U.S. Attorneys in a way that is independent of a President
or his or her surrogates.  As such, for a U.S. Attorney the law is his or her mas-
ter, as is his or her President.
This need to serve different masters, one of which is “the law,” has been
thought about more extensively in another context—the judiciary—and
frankly, the core issue is really not that different.  The disciplines of law, his-
tory, sociology, and political science—especially political science—have always
wrestled with trying to understand the political nature of judicial decisionmak-
ing.  Though there are fierce debates over how, and how much, politics should
and does influence judicial decisionmaking, after the advent of legal realism or
the behavioral revolution in the social sciences, few scholars today would sub-
scribe to the myth that impartial judges find the correct answer in the law.  The
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relevant question has become:  How do law and politics interact?12  And even
though the idea of responsiveness is different for the judiciary than for the Ex-
ecutive Branch, it is still there.  The counter-majoritarian dilemma is about this
and, perhaps ironically, part of the resolution to that dilemma is that respon-
siveness is supposed to enter in through presidential appointment.13
The question is not whether one can solve the politics-versus-law point
normatively.  The normative debate will and should continue, but as with the
judiciary, it will not be resolved.  Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that it should
not be resolved.14  We want the Justice Department to try to serve both mas-
ters, even though such a desire often is ultimately contradictory.  One’s position
at any given time will probably depend on what one thinks about a particular
President’s or U.S. Attorney’s agenda.  That the normative question remains,
however, does not mean that thinking about U.S. Attorneys must be atheoreti-
cal and anecdotal.  Theory can help us better understand how and why U.S. At-
torneys behave as they do, when they will serve which master, and when they
will serve themselves.
III
PRINCIPALS, PRINCIPLES, AND AGENTS
Political scientists have returned their attention to the study of institutional
relationships and, by borrowing and modifying theoretical concepts developed
by economists, have developed a vocabulary for talking about and analyzing hi-
erarchical relationships.15  Many political institutions can be looked at as collec-
tions of hierarchical relationships in which the subordinate is given responsibil-
ity to carry out certain tasks defined by the superior.  These are called
principal/agent relationships.  Rather than thinking in terms of masters and
servants, or fidelity to the law or to the President, it may be more helpful to
think in terms of principals and agents.  Why would we want to try to under-
stand U.S. Attorneys in the context of a theoretical construct such as princi-
pal/agent theory?  The nature of the academic enterprise is always to aspire to-
ward theory-driven understandings of phenomena.  Because if, for example,
                                                          
12. The literature in political science has been consumed by this debate.  For an example that sees
the law as having no meaningful constraint, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993), who argue that interpretation is simply a
ruse or ex post rationalization for a Justice’s attitudes.  For an example of a decision model for Justices
that sees law as a meaningful constraint but acknowledges its indeterminacy, see H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
13. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS, 16-18 (1962); see also Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National
Policy-Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50-63 (March 1976); Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a De-
mocracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (l957); Richard Funston, The
Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795 (Sept. 1975).
14. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 214-15.
15. I owe special thanks to Joe Smith for his help on this section specifically and for constant edu-
cation and intellectual stimulation more generally.  I also am indebted to Brian Roberts for his help.
They are both excellent teachers about economics and political science; my selective use of concepts
should not reflect upon their sophistication.
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principal/agent theory were indeed applicable to U.S. Attorneys, it would open
the door to very sophisticated tools for analyzing and predicting their behavior.
Those tools are not fully exploited here, but any well-developed theory offers
them.  At the very least, some aspects of principal/agent theory provide a help-
ful way to think more generally, systematically, and theoretically about U.S.
Attorneys.
Formally, a principal/agent relationship is characterized by the delegation
of authority to take action from the individual or individuals in whom it was
originally endowed—the principal—to one or more agents.16  Economic and
contractual relationships easily fit under this concept, but it can be used more
widely.  For example, congressional committees are in some sense servants of
their chambers.  The chamber has given committee members the job of closely
examining proposed legislation and the authority to modify or kill proposed
laws.
U.S. Attorneys can be thought of as agents.  The obvious question becomes:
Who is the principal?  Is it the President?  The Attorney General?  The Justice
Department official responsible for approving the U.S. Attorney’s action?17
The law?  Can a principle (the law) be a principal?  The preceding section has
been an argument that it can.  As long as one feels that a law has independent
meaning, that one is bound to carry out its meaning, and that there is some en-
forcement and sanction for not doing so, then in principle, a principle can be a
principal for whom the U.S. Attorney is its agent.  Enforcement and sanctions
for not serving the law can come from many places, not the least of which is a
judge.  Can there be multiple principals, and, depending upon the situation, can
the principals change?  Yes, though admittedly as one admits multiple princi-
pals and stretches the concept of a principal to a thing such as the law, one be-
gins to lose the elegance and parsimony of the theory.
Returning to the theory of principal/agent relationships, the first issue is
why they exist at all.  In keeping with the economic roots of the theoretical con-
struct, the answer given is that the relationship exists because it serves the in-
terests of both parties.18  Principals gain because, through the efforts of their
agents, more of their goals are accomplished.  For example, by splitting itself
into committees, Congress can examine far more legislation in far greater detail
than it could if it met only as a Committee of the Whole.  The Department of
Justice could not begin to handle effectively the legal work of the United States
from Washington.  Much of the work done by the Department of Justice is
done by U.S. Attorneys.  Operating at a local level is not simply a logistics is-
sue, however.  As any lawyer knows, one can usually be more effective when
one understands, and is seen as a part of, the local legal culture.  U.S. Attorneys
                                                          
16. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 24 (1991).
17. Often in this essay I generally refer to the President as the principal assuming that the Attor-
ney General is his or her surrogate.  Of course, the Attorney General can be thought of as an entirely
separate principal.  See infra Part IV.A.
18. See KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 16, at 24.
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have and develop local expertise.  Principal/agent theory posits that by dele-
gating authority to agents who have more time or expertise, principals accom-
plish their goals more fully.  As Kiewiet and McCubbins note, “tremendous
gains accrue when tasks are delegated to those with the talent, training and in-
clination to do them well.”19  Agents gain through these relationships because
they are compensated by the principal.  Theorists typically assume that no
agent would enter into such a relationship if the rewards were not greater than
the agent’s opportunity costs.20  In purely economic relationships, such as be-
tween an employee and an employer, the agent is compensated by being paid.
In other types of relationships, the agent may gain stature from being ap-
pointed to a prominent position.  Returning to the Congress example, members
of congressional committees gain the right to wield disproportionate influence
over a certain policy area, which may help them with reelection.  For U.S. At-
torneys, they too, are allowed to wield a disproportionate influence which may
further their own political careers.
Agents have goals other than faithfully carrying out the wishes of their
principals.21  We shall consider more fully below some of the goals for U.S. At-
torneys.  A classic example of an agent’s goal diverging from the principal’s is
when the agent desires higher compensation.  This leads the agent to misrepre-
sent his true characteristics in order to enter into a more rewarding relation-
ship.22  For example, a moderately industrious job applicant may present him-
self as extremely industrious in order to get a high-paying job.  An applicant for
a political job may present herself as enthusiastically supporting the principal’s
agenda, even if she does not sincerely support it.  The problem of agents sys-
tematically misrepresenting their characteristics, and principals therefore con-
tracting with agents whose characteristics are less than ideal, is known as ad-
verse selection.23  Once an agent has been selected, it is likely that the principal
will still not achieve perfect implementation of her goals, even allowing for ad-
verse selection.  Any deviation from efficient implementation of the principal’s
goals due to the principal/agent relationship is known as agency loss.  Agency
losses can be divided into two categories.  First, the principal suffers agency
losses when the agent puts personal goals ahead of the principal’s goals.  Sec-
ond, the principal suffers agency costs for any effort she has to expend to moni-
tor and control the agent.  If the agency losses outweigh the gains from delega-
tion, the principal will not enter into the relationship.24  Neither of these
problems can be completely eliminated, so all solutions are less than ideal.
                                                          
19. Id.
20. See id. at 25.
21. See id. at 24-25.  For general discussions of principal/agent theory, see Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), and Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 739 (1984).
22. See KIEWIET  & MCCUBBINS, supra note 18, at 25.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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However, by carefully designing the incentive structure, principals can reduce
agency losses to tolerable levels.25
Although principals try to screen candidates carefully to select agents most
likely to carry out their wishes, principals must always assume that agents are
self-interested and will try to achieve their own goals.  Agents often have pri-
vate information about the details of their jobs which the principal can only
discover with difficulty.26  In order to eliminate this, principals can design moni-
toring schemes that will make the agent’s activities more transparent.  One way
to do this is to require agents to make regular reports on their activities and ac-
complishments.  Another way is to rely on third parties with personal interests
in the agent’s activities to monitor the agent and inform the principal if the
agent is not faithfully doing her job.27  Beyond merely knowing whether the
agent is acting faithfully, the principal must have some means of changing the
agent’s incentive structure.28  If the principal does discover that the agent is de-
viating from her wishes, the principal must have some sanction to apply against
the agent.  This might involve terminating the relationship and seeking a new
agent or punishing the agent for the failure to carry out her responsibilities.
IV
PRINCIPALS AND POWER AT JUSTICE
A.  Multiple Principals and Power
In many instances, it is easy to determine who is the principal and who is
the agent.  For political institutions, it is more difficult because the hierarchies
are more complex.  For U.S. Attorneys and the Department of Justice, the hi-
erarchical situation is extremely complex.  This is true even if we ignore the
concept of “the law” as a principal.
There are multiple principals for U.S. Attorneys in the hierarchy at Justice.
The U.S. Attorney is officially accountable to the Attorney General, but only
the President can fire the U.S. Attorney.  If the Attorney General were simply
a surrogate for the President, then the two would have identical goals.  But the
Attorney General is actually the President’s agent; their goals are not always
the same.  Moreover, at different times one might think of several different
principals at different levels within the Department of Justice for whom the
U.S. Attorney is the agent: the Division heads (Civil, Criminal, Antitrust, etc.),
the heads of the appellate sections of each Division, the Solicitor General, and
on and on.  For example, if one considers ultimately prevailing in a case as a
goal, then the Solicitor General retains far more power than the head of a Divi-
sion or even the President or the Attorney General.  Authorizing an appeal is
                                                          
25. See id. at 28.
26. See id. at 25.
27. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
28. See KIEWIT & MCCUBBINS, supra note 16, at 29.
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the Solicitor General’s decision, even when it goes against the desires of the At-
torney General or the President.29  On the other hand, if the concern is the
authority to bring a case in the first instance, then the Solicitor General is un-
important.  Different principals, then, will have varying degrees of power de-
pending on the situation.  The idea of multiple principals requires analyzing
U.S. Attorney behavior by identifying precisely who the principal is in each
situation.
Technically, the Attorney General sets the priorities for the Department.
The official reports by U.S. Attorneys inevitably wax eloquent about how they
are fulfilling the administration’s priorities, but a close examination of the ac-
tivity of individual districts shows that there is substantial variance in local pri-
orities because of the discretion that lies with each individual local U.S. Attor-
ney.  Drug enforcement may be the priority of the Attorney General, but if
civil rights enforcement is the U.S. Attorney’s priority, there is little that can be
done.  There are potentially huge incentives to depart from the administration’s
agenda.  This headquarters/field disparity phenomenon is not unique to the
Justice Department, but the ability to control it may be.  As presidential ap-
pointees, the Attorney General cannot fire the U.S. Attorneys, and for a Presi-
dent to do so over a disagreement over priorities is unlikely.
The power of U.S. Attorneys is far greater than an organizational chart
would imply.  While Justice Department organizational charts are careful not
to spell out hierarchy too clearly, one might conclude from looking at manuals
and procedures that U.S. Attorneys are near the bottom.  But that does not be-
gin to describe reality.  Granted, many of the decisions of U.S. Attorneys re-
quire approval from “Main Justice,”30 at least in theory.  For example, civil set-
tlements over a certain dollar amount require Main Justice approval.  Often the
person who actually does the approving is a civil servant, even if the signature
of a higher official is required, so there are several layers of Justice Department
officials “under” the Attorney General and “over” the U.S. Attorney.  But few
presidential appointees see themselves as subservient to civil servants, no mat-
ter what organizational charts or standard operating procedures may dictate.
Some U.S. Attorneys even question where they fit in the hierarchy vis-à-vis
other presidential appointees at Main Justice.  Many U.S. Attorneys see them-
selves as really subordinate only to the Attorney General, and even that rela-
tionship is complex.  It is not simply an issue of how U.S. Attorneys see them-
selves; there is a political reality that adds to their power.  U.S. Attorneys are
presidential appointees plus:  Not only is a U.S. Attorney a presidential ap-
pointee, but his or her prime sponsor is usually a U.S. Senator.  Therefore, a
U.S. Attorney’s political strength at times can cause headaches for the Attor-
ney General—not to mention the Deputy, Associate, or Assistant who tries to
                                                          
29. Technically, the President or Attorney General could overrule the Solicitor General, but this
rarely happens.  As far as the U.S. Attorney is concerned, the Solicitor General is the final decision-
maker on appeals.
30. “Main Justice” is commonly used to refer to the offices and people located in the principal Jus-
tice Department building in Washington.
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rein him or her in.31  This is not to say that all or even many U.S. Attorneys are
power-hungry, or rampant questioners of authority structures, or that they are
frequently out of sync with Main Justice.  It does suggest that looking at an or-
ganizational chart of the Justice Department or reading the U.S. Attorneys
Manual, with all of its requirements for coordination and approval by Main Jus-
tice, will do little to help one understand the true power of U.S. Attorneys.
Moreover, any student of bureaucracy or political institutions knows that such
a structure encourages a special type of turf war.  Even if one observes what is
generally a good relationship between Main Justice and U.S. Attorneys, it may
be anticipated reactions that make it so.
In short, it is difficult to know exactly where power lies.  For example, the
Attorney Deskbook for the Civil Division in the Bush Administration states
quite emphatically and tersely who is the boss:
Upon receipt of a new matter, the Director of each branch or his/her designee will
make the initial decision on whether the case should be personally handled within the
Civil Division, jointly handled with the United States Attorney for the district where
the case is or will be brought, sent to the U.S. Attorney with the Division retaining
supervisory jurisdiction, or delegated to the U.S. Attorney. . . .  Civil Division attor-
neys work closely with the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.  As previously noted, the Division
determines who will bear primary responsibility for defending the Government in the
litigation.
32
However, a later section seems to assure U.S. Attorneys that decisions affecting
them are not coming from someone less important than they: “typically all cor-
respondence with the U.S. Attorney, of Assistant U.S. Attorneys is by letter
addressed to the U.S. Attorney and signed on behalf of the [Associate Attor-
ney General] by a Director. . . .  Correspondence addressed to U.S. Attorneys
must always include ‘Honorable’ in their title.”33  Somehow one gets the im-
pression that this is not simply a tutorial in proper forms of address.  And the
Civil Division is the most highly centralized and hierarchical Division in Jus-
tice.  On criminal matters, U.S. Attorneys have far greater discretion.  The
Criminal Division may have official authority over U.S. Attorneys, but in real-
ity, decisions are usually made at the local level.  In many ways, of course, this
difference between the Civil and Criminal Divisions makes sense given the na-
ture of the two areas, but the explanation is not simply good bureaucratic or-
ganization.  It is crime that most U.S. Attorneys really care about.  Not only
does criminal work account for most of the time spent in U.S. Attorney offices,
it is also usually the highest profile area.  Prosecuting crime is especially impor-
tant for those U.S. Attorneys with political ambitions, for reasons easily imag-
inable.  There is one instance at the prosecutorial level in which Main Justice
                                                          
31. The history of the relationship between the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys has been a
long and complicated one.  Originally, U.S. Attorneys did not even report to the Attorney General.
That they do so now is unambiguous.  That came about as a result of the general efforts of the De-
partment of Justice to gain control of all government litigation.  Of crucial importance, however, is that
the Attorney General cannot fire a U.S. Attorney; only the President can.
32. See CIVIL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY DESKBOOK 7, 13 (non-public
publication during the Bush Administration).
33. See id. at 13.
PERRY.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  8:56 AM
140 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 1
pulls rank: special task forces from Washington to prosecute certain types of
crimes.  While members of the task forces are expected to coordinate with U.S.
Attorneys, as are all Main Justice officials, they tend to be significantly more
independent.  Whatever the official hierarchy, “Main Justice,” like all
“headquarters,” is largely dependent upon the “field” U.S. Attorneys to carry
out their mission.34  And hell hath no greater fury than a U.S. Attorney scorned
when it comes to a case that he or she really cares about.
Decisions about appeals are also areas of possible contention, though the
lines of authority are more respected.  Here, U.S. Attorneys face what every-
one in government faces.  Whenever the United States loses a case, the Solici-
tor General must approve the appeal.  While it is generally known and ac-
cepted that the Solicitor General controls appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court,
he or she also must approve intermediate appeals.  In the last several years, So-
licitors General have become more involved in the decisions at this stage.  In-
deed, Solicitor General Kenneth Starr personally argued cases in Courts of
Appeals from time to time to demonstrate the importance his office placed on
the first appeal.  That the Solicitor General makes the decision thwarting a U.S.
Attorney’s preferences does not mitigate all power struggles, but the power of
the Solicitor General is generally more accepted; of course, any given decision
not to appeal can cause quite a row.
U.S. Attorneys are not without protection from “meddling” outsiders, be
they task forces or other Main Justice officials.  Courts are often bounded or-
ganizations that include a judge, prosecutors, and defense lawyers; times can be
made hard for interlopers.  There are stories of judges giving the Washington
folks a tough time for ignoring the local U.S. Attorney.  Even if these are not
conscious decisions to teach the outsiders a lesson, the local U.S. Attorney sim-
ply knows the local judges and the community in ways that can often aid those
who come into the jurisdiction.  And of course, the ultimate trump for U.S. At-
torneys is to bring politicians into the bureaucratic fray.  It is not a rarity for a
U.S. Senator to take an interest in a particular case, and it rarely has to do with
the Senator’s abiding interest in the evolution of criminal law doctrine.  How-
ever, political appointees who owe much to Senatorial courtesy do understand
that they can go to that well only so many times.
In sum, understanding the real power of a U.S. Attorney is very difficult,
and power will vary greatly among U.S. Attorneys.  That said, all U.S. Attor-
neys are powerful, and much of their power derives from the fact that they are
agents in a hierarchical relationship where much power and discretion has been
delegated to them, and that power is increased by the fact that there are multi-
ple principals.  There is another major source of power for U.S. Attorneys, and
we turn to it now.
                                                          
34. The situation that may be the most comparable would be the way that U.S. Ambassadors fit
within the bureaucracy of the State Department; however, they generally do not have the patron Sena-
tor in the way that federal district judges and U.S. Attorneys do.  Moreover, the making and control-
ling of foreign policy is generally far more centralized in Washington than is the prosecution of crimes
or engaging in litigation.
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B.  Power from Success
U.S. Attorneys are powerful simply because of what they do.  We rarely
stop to think about the sheer magnitude of power involved in bringing to bear
the power and resources of the United States against an individual.  An impor-
tant additional source of power is success.  Make no mistake, U.S. Attorneys
are extremely successful at what they do.  Much has been written on the Solici-
tor General’s success rates.  Not only is the Solicitor General extraordinarily
successful in getting cases into the Supreme Court and keeping others out, but
the Solicitor General is also extraordinarily successful at winning cases.35  What
may be news to some is how successful U.S. Attorneys are.  Their records ri-
val—indeed often beat—that of the Solicitor General.36
Approximately ninety-five percent of criminal cases prosecuted by the De-
partment of Justice are handled by U.S. Attorneys.  While the civil caseload is
larger numerically, about seventy percent of U.S. Attorneys’ offices personnel
are devoted to criminal work.  In a typical year, eighty-nine percent of all at-
torney work-hours spent in U.S. District Court were devoted to criminal prose-
cutions.  On average about twelve percent of all criminal cases are disposed of
by trial.  In Fiscal Year (“FY”) 1994, U.S. Attorneys filed 33,307 criminal cases
against 51,264 defendants.  They terminated 32,231 cases against 49,792 defen-
dants.  The defendants either pled guilty or were found guilty in 85.3% of the
cases.  The guilty rates in previous years were similar: FY 1993: 85.4%; FY
1992: 84.7%; FY 1991: 84.1%.  The criminal appellate record was equally im-
pressive.  Of 7,920 appeals terminated, the U.S. Courts of Appeals ruled in fa-
vor of the United States in eighty-one percent of the cases, against the United
States in eight percent, and in favor of United States at least in part in an addi-
tional eleven percent.  For civil cases in 1994, 86,710 cases were terminated.
Courts issued judgments in 18,484 cases, and eighty-three percent of the judg-
ments were in favor of the United States.37  Of course, determining “success” in
civil cases is somewhat more difficult because true success is often determined
by settlement and compromise.  But even for criminal cases, one never knows
how many “got away” or were handled badly; doctors may bury their mistakes,
and prosecutors have their own version by not bringing charges.  That said, by
almost any measure the success rate of U.S. Attorneys is enviable.  Labeling
bureaucrats as bumbling, inefficient, and ineffective is probably wrong-headed
about most government agencies, and it certainly cannot describe the Depart-
                                                          
35. For an early discussion of this topic, see William Edward Brigman, The Office of Solicitor
General of the United States (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill) (on file with author).  See also SALOKAR, supra note 5.  For a recent discussion, see Kevin
T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505 (1998).
36. The following data comes primarily from calculations from data in UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES: FISCAL YEAR
1994 (1995).  1994 was the last year for which I could obtain data, but as can be seen, there is little
variance among years.
37. Of the civil cases filed, 17% were on behalf of the United States, 55% defended the United
States, and 28% were where the United States was otherwise designated (for example, bankruptcy
creditor or third party litigant).  See id. at 49, tbl. 4.
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ment of Justice generally or U.S. Attorneys specifically.  The figures speak for
themselves.
Whether this high success rate is normatively desirable is, of course, another
question.  Should such power reside in someone who is not elected and can so
easily resist control by superiors?  Few others have such power with such little
accountability.  The quick, but ultimately ungratifying, response is that that is
why we have a judiciary.  The normative question aside, the empirical reality is
that in politics, success magnifies power.  There can be no doubt that U.S. At-
torneys are powerful and that their success makes them extraordinarily impor-
tant players in the Department of Justice and strengthens their hand as agents.
In addition to power, however, a crucial element of principal/agent theory is
that agents have goals that may not serve the interests of the principal.
V
PREDICTING AND CONTROLLING THE BEHAVIOR OF U.S. ATTORNEYS
Recall that principal/agent theory suggests that agents have some goals
other than carrying out the wishes of their principals.  To avoid the problems of
agency loss and adverse selection, the President or the Attorney General must
pay attention to what the goals of a potential or existing U.S. Attorney are, not
only to his or her ideology or competence.
A.  U.S. Attorney Goals
U.S. Attorneys are a varied lot.  They can range from a flamboyant, overt
politician who litigates high profile issues in a high profile district, such as the
Southern District of New York, to an eminence grise who is known only to
elites within his or her own district and where much of the work is local in na-
ture.  Incidentally, such factors are not necessarily correlated.  Flamboyant U.S.
Attorneys are sometimes found in districts that are, relatively speaking, low-
profile.  Some U.S. Attorneys expect to pursue elected political office after
their stint as a U.S. Attorney and campaign throughout their tenure, while oth-
ers aspire to the federal bench, requiring a different sort of campaigning.  Some
return to private practice.  All, however, are political.
When people refer to U.S. Attorneys as “political,” they often mean that
they are seeking higher office.  But politics can be expressed in many ways.
Some U.S. Attorneys seek no office but are very ideological and see their job as
an opportunity to further their political ideology.  The ideology can be partisan,
or it can be personal predispositions about crime, law, and justice.  Other U.S.
Attorneys are consummate bureaucrats.  Although they have ideas about crime
and justice, they measure their performance by efficient case processing and
win/loss records, or another such accomplishment.  Whatever the goals and
workstyles, all U.S. Attorneys are about the “authoritative allocation of val-
ues,” perhaps the most famous definition of politics.  The values they choose to
allocate are determined by their own goals and how they understand their own
authority.  In short, U.S. Attorneys come in all political shapes and sizes with
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all sorts of different goals.  To be sure, all U.S. Attorneys are to some degree
bureaucratic, ideological, partisan, self-interested, supportive of their President,
and believers in the rule of law, but they vary in the proportions of the mix.
One could determine systematically what the various goals of U.S. Attorneys
are and determine how the goals vary across many variables; those are answer-
able, empirical questions.  The purpose of this essay, however, is largely theo-
retical and speculative and instead proposes hypotheses for further empirical
study.
B.  Goals and Behavior
One might array the goals of U.S. Attorneys along two axes, creating a
four-quadrant typology.  The first axis is whether the U.S. Attorney has future
political aspirations; the second is the extent to which the U.S. Attorney is
ideological.  This scheme might help predict how these priorities will effect the
U.S. Attorney’s behavior in office.
High Political Aspirations
I II
Ideological Non-ideological
III  IV
Low Political Aspirations
Type I U.S. Attorneys act in ways that would bring them to the attention of
relevant publics—either the electorate or those who can nominate and support
them for a federal judgeship.  One way is to seek high profile, ideological
cases.38  If the President is the principal, the U.S. Attorney’s personal goals
should not be problematic, so long as the President chose a U.S. Attorney of
the same ideology.  If, however, the Attorney General or the Justice Depart-
ment is the principal, choosing high profile cases or engaging in publicity-
seeking behavior may be troublesome.39  The Department might exert control
                                                          
38. What constitutes a high profile case that would gain political favor might vary depending upon
the higher office sought.  For purposes here, however, these aspirations to various higher positions
have been combined.
39. In discussing the remaining types of U.S. Attorneys, distinctions between the President and
other principals within the Justice Department are generally not made; the focus is on the President
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by forbidding appeals or by taking them over, but the appellate process is a
costly way of controlling the problems of publicity-seeking behavior by U.S.
Attorneys.  Furthermore, when U.S. Attorneys are not allowed to appeal cases
they have lost, especially high profile cases, they often throw fits.  If one thinks
of “law” as the principal, Type I U.S. Attorneys might be less desirable.  A per-
son who is seeking high profile cases and is particularly ideological might be
more tempted to use the power of the office for partisan reasons.  High profile
cases do not necessarily equal partisan cases, but where the U.S. Attorney has
high political aspirations and is particularly ideological, there seems to be a
greater chance for more partisan justice.
Type IV U.S. Attorneys would be those most different from Type I.  Type
IV U.S. Attorneys would be those most likely to be bureaucratic.  They would
run an office that would reward high efficiency.  Since the U.S. Attorney is nei-
ther ideological nor possessed of political aspirations, he or she would gain sat-
isfaction from processing workloads and would seek to maximize winning all
types of cases.  If the President is the principal, he may or may not want such a
U.S. Attorney, especially if he wanted to further his ideology through the law.
If, instead, the President values bureaucratic performance and efficiency and
does not see the Justice Department as the appropriate place to further his
agenda, then a Type IV attorney may be fine.  For example, President Reagan
and Edwin Meese would have valued Type I U.S. Attorneys, whereas President
Carter and Griffin Bell would have valued Type IV U.S. Attorneys.  On the
other hand, if law is the principal, a Type IV attorney is the prototype of a good
agent.  He or she is likely to pursue an impartial administration of justice free
from the political pressure and ideology that may stretch the law beyond its in-
tent.
Type III U.S. Attorneys are potentially problematic.  Low political aspira-
tions with high ideology can cut different ways.  Such U.S. Attorneys are free to
pursue their agendas with little restraint from political forces within or outside
the Justice Department.  This could further the President’s agenda in a dra-
matic fashion because of the indifference to personal political consequences.
The same indifference, however, might allow the U.S. Attorney to feel free to
ignore the President.  Interestingly, this balance of risks does not change when
law is the principal.  The person is willing to enforce the law irrespective of
consequences, but his or her ideology could also lead to zealotry without politi-
cal restraint.
Finally, Type II U.S. Attorneys would seek high profile cases and public
recognition because of their political ambitions, but the types of cases that they
pursue might not be in accord with the priorities of the President or the De-
partment of Justice.  That may or may not serve a President well in the long
run, but it is not an agent that is particularly controllable by the principal.  Un-
like Types III and IV, Type II U.S. Attorneys are subject to the influence of
                                                          
versus the law.  Nevertheless, to exploit fully the theory and to develop fully the types, it would be cru-
cial to identify all the principals.
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political forces generally, including seeking the President’s favor.  However,
what pleases the local electorate may not be what pleases the President.  If the
goal is a future elective local office, the President may not be able to assert
much control over the U.S. Attorney.  On the other hand, Type II U.S. Attor-
neys are more consonant with conventional notions of “serving the law” but,
unlike Type IV situations, the driving force for Type II U.S. Attorneys is serv-
ing their own political futures.
With proper operationalization and specification, the validity of this ty-
pology to predict and explain behavior can be tested.  There are undoubtedly
other ways to think of arraying the goals of U.S. Attorneys to predict agency
loss.  The main point, however, is that one can generalize about U.S. Attorneys
in meaningful ways, and that we are not limited to discussing only the idiosyn-
crasies of individual U.S. Attorneys or their districts.
C.  Support, Success, and Independence
There are indicators other than the agent’s goals, such as performance and
external support, that also might predict the independence—or rogue behav-
ior—of U.S. Attorneys.  Such variables are not particularly helpful at the selec-
tion stage, but they might help explain behavior in a way that is based less on
personality or political ambitions.  Though highly political U.S. Attorneys may
engage in political grandstanding and seem very independent, their ability to be
successfully independent is something else.
Again we create two axes.  The political support axis measures outside po-
litical support, such as U.S. Senators, though it could refer to political support
from important people anywhere.  The success axis refers not necessarily to
win/loss records, but rather to whether the U.S. Attorney is successful at
achieving outcomes that reflect well upon Main Justice.
Great Success
V VI
High Political Support Low Political Support
VII  VIII
Modest Success
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U.S. Attorneys classified as Type V would be the most truly independent.
Though they may irritate some people at Main Justice, they win and they are
politically powerful.  When they wish to do something against the desires of
Main Justice, they are the U.S. Attorneys that are most likely to prevail.  In
practice, actual confrontations are probably rare because of anticipated reac-
tions; the U.S. Attorney will rarely need to call on his or her outside support.
Type VIII U.S. Attorneys, of course, have the least degrees of freedom.
Though they may appear independent and actual confrontations may be rare,
they are nonetheless the ones most easily controlled by Main Justice.
Type VI U.S. Attorneys might often be left to their own devices because of
their success; however, Main Justice can rein them in without fear of trouble
from the outside.  Unlike Type VIII, though, if Main Justice uses too heavy a
hand, they risk alienating a very successful U.S. Attorney, which is a significant
cost.  An agent often has more and different information than the principal, so
some slippage in control is often in the principal’s best interest, particularly if
the U.S. Attorney is successful.
Type VII U.S. Attorneys will receive more control from Main Justice:  To
the extent that they are only modestly successful, there is an incentive to stay
on top of them.  However, from time to time Type VII U.S. Attorneys may be
able to assert extraordinary independence, but it will generally require the ac-
tive solicitation of their political support or the anticipated reaction by Main
Justice that they will do so.
Again, this typology is only a hypothesis about general tendencies.  Perhaps
things do not work this way.  Principal/agent theory suggests that they might,
and with proper operationalization, these hypotheses are testable.  Anecdotes
from my interviews lend support to these theories.  One might imagine differ-
ent factors that would better predict and explain behavior.  Indeed, to predict
behavior successfully would require a multivariate analysis for which these hy-
potheses are the first steps.  The main point, however, is that U.S. Attorneys
are agents and, as such, one can think about the power of U.S. Attorneys in
ways that are generalizable and systematic.
VI
CONCLUSION
Principals can try to control agents, at first by selection.  Given senatorial
courtesy, this is not as straightforward as it seems; but Presidents have been in-
creasingly attuned to appointing lower court judges who match their philoso-
phy despite senatorial courtesy.  The difficulty of controlling U.S. Attorneys
once appointed means that a President is well advised to avoid adverse selec-
tions as much as possible.  A President should probably first consider the ideol-
ogy of the appointee; other motivations are difficult to detect and control.  The
President and his or her advisers would also be well advised to try to under-
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stand the political aspirations of a potential appointee, including whether those
aspirations are toward elective office or the federal bench.  To the extent that
they are the former, the President will have a more difficult time controlling the
U.S. Attorney.  The President is in a far more powerful position if the aspira-
tion is to the bench assuming that he or she will do the appointing.  The Attor-
ney General as principal would want to know the political aspirations of a po-
tential U.S. Attorney, but he or she would also want to know the extent of
outside political support that that person might have. The law as principal, of
course, cannot be so anthropomorphized that it can be involved in the selection
process.  Its hope lies more in efforts at control.
With regard to controlling agency loss, principal/agent theory suggests the
need to monitor agents’ activities and to be willing to terminate the relation-
ship.  Firing a U.S. Attorney is a dramatic action that could have all sorts of
political ramifications.  Nevertheless, Presidents could undoubtedly control
U.S. Attorneys better if they were willing to fire a few, particularly if done at
the recommendation of the Attorney General.  Putting aside the normative
question of making U.S. Attorneys too politically responsive, more active firing
policies would undoubtedly reduce agency loss.  One could, of course, make a
distinction between firing U.S. Attorneys for politically unpopular stands and
firing them because they are too interested in furthering their own political ca-
reers.  The argument is not that more control is desirable, just that it would
work.  At the very least, a candidate for Attorney General might want to get
the President’s assurance that when she or he recommends that a U.S. Attor-
ney be fired, it will happen.  Less dramatic than termination, the Attorney
General or others can make it more difficult for the U.S. Attorney to achieve
his or her goals.  For example, the Attorney General could deny authorization
to pursue a case, or could refuse to appeal a case that would be highly advanta-
geous to the U.S. Attorney’s political career or ideology.
Monitoring and controlling people so far from Washington is inherently dif-
ficult.  Even with all the requirements of approval and report writing, Washing-
ton often learns of developments too late to make a difference.  The Depart-
ment has installed computerized case management systems to make it easier to
monitor field offices.  Another way to monitor behavior is to rely on third par-
ties with interests in the agents’ activities to monitor the agents and inform the
principal.  With litigating authority centralized in the Justice Department,
agency lawyers and others within the Department monitor the activities of the
U.S. Attorney.  My interviews to date, however, suggest that Main Justice cir-
cles the wagons when the criticism comes from other government agencies.
Judges are more potent monitors.  The way judges serve law as principal is ob-
vious.  They also can serve the Executive Branch by being a third party moni-
tor.  Few things would get the Department’s attention quicker than to have a
judge, in the many ways that he or she can, inform the Department of a U.S.
Attorney’s activities.  At some point, we face a separation of powers issue.
When a monitoring judge serves the law it is not problematic, but when an ac-
tion is simply an effort to control the behavior of someone in another branch, it
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becomes potentially troublesome.  Nevertheless, judges are a potential infor-
mation source to the principal, and could be encouraged to do more.
Finally, the idea that U.S. Attorneys can be agents simultaneously of more
than one principal causes some problems for the economic theory of principals
and agents.  For political theory, it is an old story.  Political theorists talk about
the dilemma of serving two masters when they discuss the Burkean dilemma;
that is, should a representative do what she thinks the people of her district
want, or should she do what she perceives to be in the greater interest?  Most
citizens believe in both as a normative proposition.  Moreover, we know that
most representatives act in both ways, and they generally see no inherent con-
tradiction.  Representatives rarely feel as if they face this dilemma, but when
they do, they usually try to avoid the decision or minimize the cognitive disso-
nance however they can.40  U.S. Attorneys are no different—usually, the U.S.
Attorney does not see a difference in what her political principals want, what
the law requires, and her own goals.  In sum, most people in politics must face
the dilemma of serving two masters, but unlike the Biblical injunction, there is
no need to grow to hate one or the other; rather they can lie beside one another
like a lion and a lamb, so long as we understand what motivates their behavior.
                                                          
40. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 282-84.
